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ORGANIZING PRINCIPLES: 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CARD-CHECK LAWS 
RAFAEL GELY* AND TIMOTHY CHANDLER** 
The use of “card checks” as a method of union organizing has recently 
garnered a lot of attention, much of it surrounding the proposed Employee 
Free Choice Act.  If passed, this legislation would amend the National Labor 
Relations Act by requiring employers to recognize a union when the employer 
is presented with evidence of majority support for union recognition via union 
authorization cards.  Although the proposed bill has had difficulty gaining 
traction in the U.S. Congress, several states have recently passed similar 
legislation covering state and local public employees.  In this article, we 
compare card-check organizing by public sector employees in Illinois and 
Ohio.  In both states, card-check organizing has been allowed since 1983.  
However, in 2003 Illinois amended its statute to require employers to 
recognize unions on the basis of card checks, while no similar change 
occurred in Ohio.  A comparative analysis of public sector organizing activity 
in Illinois and Ohio, before and after the Illinois law was changed, identifies 
the effects of changes in the law and explores the possible implications in other 
contexts.  In a sense, the experience of these two states provides a natural 
experiment on the effects of public sector card-check legislation on organizing 
activity. 
Data was collected from state labor relations agencies in Illinois and Ohio to 
examine the overall levels and patterns of organizing activity in both states 
during the period under study (1999-2008), as well as specific contextual 
conditions associated with organizing activity in the two states.  Our data show 
that in Ohio, where card-check recognition is voluntary, elections run by the 
state labor agency have been the dominant means of organizing new members.  
That was also the case in Illinois until 2003, when mandatory card-check 
legislation was enacted.  Since then, the most organizing has occurred via the 
mandatory card-check provision.  Moreover, we find the Illinois’ legislation 
not only facilitated union organizing, but also expanded their organizing 
activity into different contexts.  
 
* James E. Campbell Missouri Endowed Professor of Law, University of Missouri School of 
Law. 
** Catherine M. Rucks Professor of Management, William and Catherine M. Rucks Department 
of Management, E.J. Ourso College of Business, Louisiana State University. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Union organizing via card-check recognition, wherein employers are 
required to recognize the union as the representative of employees on the basis 
of authorization cards without a need for an election, has garnered considerable 
attention, much of it surrounding the proposed Employee Free Choice Act 
(“EFCA”).1  If passed into law, the EFCA will amend the National Labor 
Relations Act (“NLRA”)2 by requiring employers to recognize a union when 
the employer is presented with evidence of majority support for union 
recognition via card check.3  The EFCA represents a significant departure from 
the NLRA, which currently allows for card-check organizing based only on 
voluntary acquiescence of the employer, an unlikely event given the strident 
opposition to unions by U.S. employers.4 
 
 1. For the most recent version of the EFCA, see H.R. 1409, 111th Cong. (2009); S. 560, 
111th Cong. (2009).  Similar bills had been introduced in three previous congressional sessions.  
See JON O. SHIMABUKURO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE ACT 1 & n.1 
(2011), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RS21887_20110112.pdf.  States have also 
passed similar legislation.  See generally ROBERT BRUNO ET AL., UNIV. OF ILL. SCH. OF LABOR 
& EMP’T RELATIONS, MAJORITY AUTHORIZATIONS AND UNION ORGANIZING IN THE PUBLIC 
SECTOR: A FOUR-STATE PERSPECTIVE (2009), available at http://www.aflcio.org/joinaun 
ion/voiceatwork/efca/upload/multistate_efca051409.pdf.  This report surveys laws mandating 
petitions or card check for public sector workers in New York, Illinois, New Jersey, and Oregon. 
 2. Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 
(2006)). 
 3. H.R. 1409, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009); S. 560, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009).  The EFCA requires 
the NLRB to develop model authorization language and procedures for establishing the validity 
of signed authorization cards.  H.R. 1409, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009); S. 560, 111th Cong. § 2 
(2009).  The EFCA also provides stronger penalties for employers’ violations occurring while 
employees are attempting to form a union or attain a first contract.  H.R. 1409, 111th Cong. §§ 
10, 12 (2009); S. 560, 111th Cong. §§ 10, 12 (2009).  The proposed amendments provide for civil 
fines up to $20,000 per violation against employers found to have willfully or repeatedly violated 
employees’ rights during an organizing campaign or first contract drive.  H.R. 1409, 111th Cong. 
§ 4(b)(2) (2009); S. 560, 111th Cong. § 4(b)(2) (2009).  The EFCA also increases the amount an 
employer is required to pay when an employee is discharged or discriminated against during an 
organizing campaign or first contract drive to three times back pay.  H.R. 1409, 111th Cong. § 
4(b)(1) (2009); S. 560, 111th Cong. § 4(b)(1) (2009).  Finally, the EFCA requires the Board to 
seek a federal court injunction against an employer whenever there is reasonable cause to believe 
the employer has discharged or discriminated against employees, threatened to discharge or 
discriminate against employees, or engaged in conduct that significantly interferes with employee 
rights during an organizing or first contract drive.  H.R. 1409, 111th Cong. § 4(a) (2009); S. 560, 
111th Cong. § 4(a) (2009).  For further discussion, see Rafael Gely & Timothy Chandler, Card 
Check Recognition: New House Rules for Union Organizing, 35 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 247, 248 
(2008). 
 4. See Thomas A. Kochan et al., The Effects of Corporate Strategy and Workplace 
Innovations on Union Representation, 39 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 487, 491 (1986) (noting that 
a significant percentage of employers considered being nonunion their major labor relations 
goal); see also Gely & Chandler, supra note 3, at 247. 
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Proponents of the legislation contend that the current system, which relies 
on organizing via elections conducted by the National Labor Relations Board 
(“NLRB”), fails to protect employees’ rights to organize.5  They note that the 
current system results in undue delays, fails to deter employers’ illegal 
practices, and ultimately makes it harder for employees who would prefer to be 
represented collectively by a union to do so.6  In contrast, opponents of the bill 
describe card-check organizing as anathema to basic democratic principles.7  
They argue that card-check organizing will allow unions to coerce employees 
into unwanted union representation, and, thus, that such a system will not 
protect employees who wish to exercise their true will regarding union 
representation.8 
Notwithstanding the increased interest surrounding organizing via card 
checks, neither the use of card checks, nor legislation granting its use, is new to 
the United States.  Various commentators have noted that unions in the private 
sector have used card checks as an organizing method, albeit with some 
 
 5. See ADRIENNE EATON & JILL KRIESKY, AM. RIGHTS AT WORK, FACT OVER FICTION: 
OPPOSITION TO CARD CHECK DOESN’T ADD UP (2006), available at http://www.americanrightsat 
work.org/dmdocuments/ARAWReports/IBFactOverFictFinal.pdf (examining the validity of 
claims by anti-union groups that card check campaigns leave employees more vulnerable to union 
pressure than during National Labor Relations Board elections); see also Gely & Chandler, supra 
note 3, at 247; GORDON LAFER, AM. RIGHTS AT WORK, FREE AND FAIR?: HOW LABOR LAW 
FAILS U.S. DEMOCRATIC ELECTION STANDARDS (2005), available at http://www.americanrights 
atwork.org/dmdocuments/ARAWReports/FreeandFair%20FINAL.pdf (assessing the extent to 
which National Labor Relation Board elections embody democratic principles). 
 6. Indeed, the labor movement in the United States has long been dissatisfied with the legal 
framework under which unions operate.  Gely & Chandler, supra note 3, at 247–48; see Paul F. 
Clark et al., Private-Sector Collective Bargaining: Is This the End or a New Beginning?, in 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR 1, 8–9 (Paul F. Clark et al. eds., 2002) 
(discussing the complaints unions have voiced about the current legal framework regulating the 
collective bargaining process); see also THOMAS GEOGHEHAN, WHICH SIDE ARE YOU ON? 252–
56 (1991) (discussing various unions’ concerns regarding existing labor laws).  This frustration 
was illustrated by American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations 
(“AFL-CIO”) President Lane Kirkland’s statement in the early 1980s suggesting that the NLRA 
be repealed, thereby allowing unions and employers to operate within the “law of the jungle.”  
See Cathy Trost & Leonard M. Apcar, AFL-CIO Chief Calls Labor Laws a ‘Dead Letter’—
Kirkland Says the Federation Would ‘Seriously’ Study Repeal of All But the Basic, WALL ST. J., 
Aug. 16, 1984, at 8 (noting Kirkland’s frustration with President Reagan’s administration of the 
NLRA). 
 7. Gely & Chandler, supra note 3, at 247. 
 8. See Steven Greenhouse, Employers Sharply Criticize Shift in Unionizing Method to 
Cards From Elections, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2006, at A9 (describing employers’ opposition to 
the card check process); Carl F. Horowitz, Just Sign Here, Sonny: Why Union Card Checks Are 
Coercive, FRANCHISING WORLD, Oct. 1, 2006, available at http://www.franchise.org/Franchise-
News-Detail.aspx?id=30946; James Sherk, How Union Card Checks Block Workers’ Free 
Choice, HERITAGE FOUNDATION, Feb. 21, 2007, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Labor/wm 
1366.cfm. 
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irregularity.9  Similarly, card-check organizing has been used for years in the 
public sector.  In New York, card-check organizing has been mandated since 
1958.10  Over the past decade, a growing number of states have adopted similar 
provisions either as part of their public sector collective bargaining laws, or by 
means of executive orders.11  As of 2009, twelve states mandate recognition 
via card check for at least some of their employees.12 
In this article, we draw upon the public sector experience to help fill the 
gap in our understanding of card-check organizing.  In particular, the article 
explores card-check organizing by public sector employees in Illinois and 
Ohio.  While Illinois allowed card-check organizing since 1983, it amended its 
statute in 2003 to require employers to recognize unions on the basis of card 
checks.13  Ohio has also allowed card-check recognition to occur since 1983, 
but has not passed legislation requiring card check recognition.14  An analysis 
of the Illinois’ experience, particularly public sector organizing activity before 
and after the law was changed, provides an opportunity to identify the effects 
of changes in the law and to explore the possible implications in other 
contexts.  Moreover, by comparing the Illinois’ experience to that of Ohio, we 
can more fully understand the extent to which both the presence and absence of 
card-check legislation may have affected organizing activity.  The experience 
of these two states provides a natural experiment on the effects of public sector 
card-check legislation on organizing activity. 
This article should be of interest to those seeking to understand not only 
the dynamics of card-check organizing among public sector employees but, 
more broadly, the effect of laws pertaining to public sector bargaining on the 
behavior of unions and employers.  Over the years, there has been a long 
running normative debate regarding the desirability of allowing public sector 
 
 9. Card check use has been the subject of several recent articles: James J. Brudney, 
Neutrality Agreements and Card Check Recognition: Prospects for Changing Paradigms, 90 
IOWA L. REV. 819 (2005); Adrienne E. Eaton & Jill Kriesky, Union Organizing Under Neutrality 
and Card Check Agreements, 55 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 42 (2001); Jennifer Dillard & Joel 
Dillard, Fetishizing the Electoral Process: The NLRB’s Problematic Embrace of Electoral 
Formalism (Working Paper Series, Aug. 24, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
1009636; Raja Raghunath, Stacking the Deck: Privileging “Employer Free Choice” Over 
Industrial Democracy in the Card-Check Debate, 87 NEB. L. REV. 329 (2008); Benjamin I. 
Sachs, Enabling Employee Choice: A Structural Approach to the Rules of Union Organizing, 123 
HARV. L. REV. 655 (2010). 
 10. See William A. Herbert, Card Check Labor Certification: Lessons from New York, 74 
ALBANY L. REV. 93, 133 (2010). 
 11. See infra notes 38–51 and accompanying text. 
 12. Id. 
 13. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 315/9(a–5) (West 2003). 
 14. T. Merritt Bumpass & Keith A. Ashmus, Public Sector Bargaining in a Democracy—An 
Assessment of the Ohio Public Employee Collective Bargaining Law, 33 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 593, 
597–98 (1984-85). 
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employees to organize and to bargain collectively.15  That debate has in turn 
generated an extensive academic literature on the issue of how the legal 
framework in which public sector unions operate affects their behavior.16  In 
this tradition, this article explores how a state’s legal framework regarding 
card-check organizing affects the levels and types of organizing activity among 
their public sector labor force. 
For instance, one can explore the extent to which card-check organizing 
preceded the enactment of legislation mandating public employers to recognize 
a union on the basis of a showing of majority support through card checks.  
One can also examine how the levels, rates, targets, and types of organizing 
activity were affected by the enactment of such legislation.  For example, one 
would likely expect the enactment of card-check legislation to increase the use 
of card-check organizing among labor organizations.  However, should the 
expected increase be equally spread among various types of public sector 
employers (e.g., city, county and state) and among different types of 
 
 15. Martin H. Malin, The Paradox of Public Sector Labor Law, 84 IND. L. J. 1369, 1370 
(2009); Leo Troy, Are Municipal Collective Bargaining and Municipal Governance Compatible?, 
5 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 453, 454–58 (2003); Clyde W. Summers, Public Employee 
Bargaining: A Political Perspective, 83 YALE L.J. 1156, 1173–75 (1974). 
 16. For example, scholars have debated the issue of whether the enactment of 
comprehensive public sector bargaining laws (i.e., laws protecting the right of public employees 
to organize and to bargain collectively) is a cause or an effect of high levels of public sector 
unionism.  See Hugh D. Hindman & David B. Patton, Unionism in State and Local Governments: 
Ohio and Illinois, 1982-87, 33 INDUS. REL. 106, 107–08 (1994).  On the one hand, one would 
expect the enactment of enabling legislation protecting public employees’ rights to organize and 
bargain collectively will be an antecedent of organizing activity.  See Gregory M. Saltzman, 
Public Sector Bargaining Laws Really Matter: Evidence From Ohio and Illinois, in WHEN 
PUBLIC SECTOR WORKERS UNIONIZE 41, 59–74 (Richard B. Freeman & Casey Ichniowski eds., 
1988).  On the other hand, unionization among public employees occurred in many jurisdictions 
prior to the enactment of comprehensive legislation, suggesting that perhaps a necessary 
condition for the enactment of such laws is the presence of an already unionized body of public 
employees.  See John F. Burton, Jr. & Terry Thomason, The Extent of Collective Bargaining in 
the Public Sector, in PUBLIC SECTOR BARGAINING 1 (Benjamin Aaron et. al. eds., 2d ed. 1988). 
A similar debate has developed regarding the extent to which the specific content of various 
public sector bargaining laws affects the behavior of public sector unions and employers.  A 
feature of public sector bargaining laws which varies significantly across, and even within, states 
is their structures for solving disputes between employers and employees.  Some states allow 
public employees the right to strike, while other states either ban this right altogether or do so 
with respect to some of their employees.  See Robert Hebdon, Public Sector Dispute Resolution in 
Transition, in PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT IN A TIME OF TRANSITION 85 (Dale Belman et. al. 
eds., 1996).  In some instances, states that prohibit public employee strikes provide for other 
forms of dispute resolution, such as arbitration, fact finding, and mediation.  Research has found 
that prohibitions against strikes by public employees have not completely eliminated strike 
activity and that, in fact, laws allowing public employees to strike do not appear to have a 
significant effect on strike incidence.  Id. at 93. 
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employees (e.g., clerical, fire, police)?  These are some of the issues addressed 
in this article. 
This article is also relevant to the debate surrounding the enactment of the 
EFCA.  While there are clearly major differences between the public and 
private sectors which caution against assuming that the experience in one 
sector will be replicated in the other, at a very basic level, card-check 
organizing in both sectors involves some similar dynamics.  Thus, the 
developments that follow the enactment of public sector card-check legislation 
might be instructive for those interested in understanding the possible effects 
of the EFCA. 
In Section II, we briefly describe the legal landscape surrounding public 
sector bargaining laws, as well as what the various state laws provide with 
respect to card-check organizing, particularly in Illinois and Ohio.  In the 
remainder of the article we explore the effects of the Illinois’ card-check 
statute. 
In section III, we identify the likely effects of a card-check statute on the 
behavior of labor unions.  In particular, we expect that the Illinois’ card-check 
statute will result in: an increase in overall organizing activity, increased 
reliance on card checks as an organizing technique, and an increased ability on 
the part of unions to expand their organizing targets. 
In section IV, we use data collected from state labor relations agencies in 
Illinois and Ohio to examine the overall levels of organizing activity in both 
states during the period under study (1999-2008), as well as the extent to 
which organizing activity was driven by elections as opposed to card-check 
activity.  Consistent with prior research, our data show that in Ohio, where 
card-check recognition is voluntary, elections run by the state labor agency 
have been the predominant means of organizing new members.  That was also 
the case in Illinois until 2003, when mandatory card-check legislation was 
enacted.  Since then, the overwhelming majority of organizing has occurred via 
the mandatory card-check provision.17 
Section V further explores changes in organizing activity resulting from 
the enactment of card-check legislation in Illinois by comparing organizing 
activity in Illinois to activity in Ohio before and after the passage of mandatory 
card-check legislation in Illinois.18  The cross-sectional (i.e., Illinois and Ohio) 
and time-series (i.e., pre and post card-check legislation in Illinois) 
comparisons allow a more complete picture of the effects of the Illinois 
legislation on the organizing activities of public sector employees.  Our 
objective in this section is to identify the changes that occur in organizing 
behavior, and also to explore the nature of those changes.  For part of our 
analysis, we use a methodological technique known as Qualitative 
 
 17. See infra Table 1 & Figure 1. 
 18. See infra Tables 2–5. 
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Comparative Analysis (“QCA”).19  QCA relies on the algebra of logic and sets 
and can be used to identify combinations of conditions that are distinctively 
associated with an outcome. 
In section VI, we briefly describe this methodology and the results we 
obtained from applying QCA to our data.20  Several interesting findings 
emerge from this analysis.  For example, we find that the Illinois legislation 
not only facilitated the ability of unions to organize, but also that unions 
responded by expanding their organizing activity into different contexts.21 
Section VII discusses the implications of our findings for understanding 
card-check organizing, both among public and private sector employees, and 
Section VIII concludes the article. 
II.  THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT 
A. State Level Organizing and Collective Bargaining Laws 
The enactment of collective bargaining laws for public sector employees is 
a fairly recent phenomenon.  Before 1965, only a few states had enacted 
statutes safeguarding the rights of public sector employees to organize and 
bargain collectively.22  By the end of that decade, however, twenty-one states 
had adopted legislation granting organizing and bargaining rights to at least 
some of their public employees.23  Over the next several decades, various other 
states, including Illinois and Ohio, enacted comprehensive bargaining laws. 
The legal environment covering state and local employees has been 
described as a “crazy-quilt patchwork of state and local laws, regulations, 
executive orders, court decisions, and attorney general opinions.”24  For 
example, states differ significantly in terms of the type of employees covered.  
Twenty-four states (and the District of Columbia) have laws covering all major 
occupational groups (police, fire, education, state, and municipal employees).25  
Six states have enacted legislation covering police, fire, and education 
 
 19. See CHARLES RAGIN, THE COMPARATIVE METHOD: MOVING BEYOND QUALITATIVE 
AND QUANTITATIVE STRATEGIES 85–102 (1987). 
 20. See infra Table 6. 
 21. Id. 
 22. In 1955, New Hampshire and Minnesota enacted legislation providing for some limited 
collective bargaining rights for some public employees.  In 1959, Wisconsin enacted legislation 
granting municipal employees organizational, representational, and bargaining rights.  See 
JOSEPH R. GRODIN ET AL., PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 81 (2004). 
 23. Id. 
 24. John Lund & Cheryl L. Maranto, Public Sector Labor Law: An Update, in PUBLIC 
SECTOR EMPLOYMENT IN A TIME OF TRANSITION, supra note 16, at 21, 21; see also James T. 
Bennett & Marick F. Masters, The Future of Public Sector Labor-Management Relations, 24 J. 
LAB. RES. 533, 535 (2003). 
 25. See Bennett & Masters, supra note 24, at 536. 
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employees only,26 while another eight states have laws protecting at least one 
of these major occupational groups.27 
The remaining twelve states have not enacted comprehensive bargaining 
laws; however, among these states, there are significant differences with regard 
to the rights of public employees to organize and bargain collectively.  Some 
states make public sector bargaining illegal by making agreements between 
public employers and labor organizations representing public employees 
“illegal, unlawfully void and of no effect,”28 or by limiting the authority of 
public employers to recognize, bargain with, or enter into agreements with any 
organization representing public sector employees.29  A minority of states have 
constitutions and statutes that include general provisions protecting the right to 
organize and/or bargain collectively.30 
Not only do state level bargaining laws differ in the types of employees 
covered, but there is also significant variance in rights provided to employees 
that are covered by legislation.31  For example, differences exist regarding the 
types of employee activities protected under the various statutes,32 the factors 
 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id.  The fact that the state does not have a bargaining law does not necessarily imply the 
absence of labor organizations and of collective bargaining agreements.  For example, in Missouri 
there is a meet and confer statute which allows for the organization of some bargaining 
employees and for negotiations of collective agreements.  Similarly, in Missouri the state 
constitution guarantees employees “the right to organize and to bargain collectively through 
representatives of their own choosing.”  MO. CONST. art. I, § 29.  The right to bargain collectively 
in Missouri was recently strengthened by a decision of the Missouri Supreme Court, reversing 
prior decisions and finding that the Missouri Constitution protects the rights of public employees 
to collective bargaining.  Independence-Nat’l Educ. Ass’n v. Independence Sch. Dist., 223 
S.W.3d 131 (Mo. 2007) (en banc).  Following the Independence School Dist. decision, school 
districts and the associations representing their employees have begun to experiment with various 
approaches to implement the state’s Supreme Court decision.  See, e.g., Springfield Nat’l Educ. 
Ass’n v. The Sch. Dist. of Springfield, R-12, No. 0931-CV08322 (Cir. Ct. Green Cnty., Mo. Sept. 
10, 2009), available at http://www.showmedaily.org/pdfs/GreeneCountyrulingNEA.pdf. 
 28. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-98 (2009). 
 29. VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-57.2 (2008). 
 30. Among these states are: Florida, FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 6; Hawaii, HAW. CONST. art. 13, § 
2; Missouri, MO. CONST. art. I, § 29.; Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-20-7 (2010). 
 31. For a review of the differences among state collective bargaining statutes, see GRODIN 
ET AL., supra note 22, at 92–93, 134–36, 213–20, 316–17. 
 32. Some states define the types of employees’ activities covered under the bargaining laws 
narrowly.  For example, in Oregon public employees have “the right to form, join and participate 
in the activities of labor organizations of their own choosing for the purpose of representation and 
collective bargaining with their public employers on matters concerning employment relations.”  
OR. REV. STAT. § 243.662 (2011).  Other states protect, more expansively, the same types of 
activities protected under the National Labor Relations Act for private sector employees.  For 
example, the Delaware statute protects employees’ rights to: “(1) Organize, form, join or assist 
any employee organization . . . [;] (2) Negotiate collectively or grieve through representative of 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
484 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXX:475 
used to determine the appropriate bargaining unit,33 and the inclusion of 
supervisors and managers in the definition of the term “employee.”34 
There are also a wide variety of approaches among the states in their 
treatment of card-check activity—the subject of this paper.  Some states 
closely follow the approach taken under the NLRA for private sector 
employees.  Bargaining laws in these states provide for the certification of a 
union as the exclusive bargaining representative based on the results of a 
certification election conducted by the appropriate state agency in charge of 
enforcing the law, while either explicitly or implicitly allowing public 
employers to voluntarily recognize the union.  The Alaska collective 
bargaining statute, for example, states that no other provision in the statute 
“prohibits the recognition of an organization as the exclusive representative by 
a public agency by mutual consent.”35  Similarly, New Mexico’s statute allows 
a public employer and a labor organization “with a reasonable basis for 
claiming to represent a majority of the employees in an appropriate bargaining 
unit [to] establish an alternative appropriate procedure for determining 
majority status.”36 
A small group of states’ statutes appear to prohibit the use of voluntary 
recognition, and instead require that an election be held.  For example, Kansas’ 
statute granting bargaining rights to most public employees provides, in part, 
that “[r]ecognition shall be granted only to an employee organization that has 
been selected as a representative of an appropriate unit, in a secret ballot 
election, by a majority of the employees in an appropriate unit who voted at 
such election.”37 
At the other end of the spectrum, a growing number of states require 
employers to recognize a union that has secured majority support by card 
 
their own choosing[; and] (3) Engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective 
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection . . . .”  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 1303 (2011). 
 33. See GRODIN ET AL., supra note 22, at 93. 
 34. Id. at 140, 152. 
 35. ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.100(d) (2007). 
 36. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 10-7E-14 (1978). 
 37. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4327(d) (1997).  Compare this language to the language found in 
Kansas’ statute applicable to teachers.  The statute provides that “any professional employees’ 
organization may file a request with the board of education alleging that a majority of the 
professional employees in an appropriate negotiating unit wish to be represented for such purpose 
by such organization and asking the board of education to recognize it as the exclusive 
representative . . . .”  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-5416(a) (1997).  The next section then provides: “A 
request for recognition under subsection (a) shall be granted by the board of education unless: (1) 
The board of education has a good faith doubt as to the accuracy or validity of the evidence 
demonstrating majority support . . . .”  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-5416(b) (1997). 
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checks or other appropriate means.38  New York, for example, has provided for 
certification based on a showing of majority support without an election since 
1958.  New York’s public sector collective bargaining law mandates the New 
York Public Employee Relations Board to “ascertain the public employees’ 
choice of employee organization as their representative choice . . . on the basis 
of dues deduction authorization or other evidence, or, if necessary, by 
conducting an election.”39  More recently, a number of states have followed 
New York’s lead by enacting similar legislation, including: California,40 
Illinois,41 Massachusetts,42 New Hampshire,43 New Jersey,44 and Oregon.45  
 
 38. For a detailed description of some of these statutes, see Mark Hoffman, The Debate in 
Congress Over Card Check and the Employee Free Choice Act: Federal Questions and State 
Answers (unpublished working paper) (on file with authors). 
 39. N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 207.2 (McKinney 2010).  The New York Public Employee 
Relations Board’s rules implementing the statute provide that where only one labor organization 
is seeking to represent the employees, 
the employee organization involved will be certified without an election if a majority of 
the employees within the unit have indicated their choice by the execution of dues 
deduction authorization cards which are current, or by individual designation cards which 
have been executed within six months prior to the date of the director’s decision 
recommending certification without an election. 
N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 201.9(g) (McKinney 2010).  For a detailed account of the history and 
development of New York’s card check legislation, see Herbert, supra note 10. 
 40. The California law states: 
A public agency shall grant exclusive or majority recognition to an employee organization 
based on a signed petition, authorization cards, or union membership cards showing that a 
majority of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit desire the representation, 
unless another labor organization has previously been lawfully recognized as exclusive or 
majority representative of all or part of the same unit. 
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 3507.1(c) (West 2010).  Similar provisions are also applicable to the state’s 
K-12 employees, CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 3544.1, 3544, 3544.7 (West 2010); secondary educational 
employees, CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 3574, 3577 (West 2010); court interpreters, CAL. GOV’T CODE 
§ 71823(a)(5)(A) (West 2009); and other trial employees, CAL. GOV’T CODE § 71636.3 (West 
2010). 
 41. “The Board shall designate an exclusive representative for purposes of collective 
bargaining when the representative demonstrates a showing of majority interest by employees in 
the unit.”  5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 315/9(a-5) (2008).  A similar provision covers educational 
employees.  115 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7(b) (2008). 
 42. “Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, the commission shall certify and 
the public employer shall recognize as the exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
bargaining of all the employees in the bargaining unit an employee organization which has 
received a written majority authorization . . . .”  MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 150E, § 4 (LexisNexis 
2008). 
 43. “Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, the board shall certify and the 
public employer shall recognize as the exclusive representative an employee organization which 
has received a written majority authorization for the purpose of collective bargaining of all the 
employees in the bargaining unit.”  N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 273-A:10, IX (LexisNexis Supp. 
2007) (repealed Aug. 8, 2011). 
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These states mandate card-check recognition for all employees covered under 
their public sector collective bargaining laws.  Several other states mandate 
card-check recognition for some of their public sector employees, but not for 
others.  For example, the statutes in Kansas,46 Connecticut,47 Maryland,48 and 
North Dakota,49 mandate card-check recognition for teachers only; in 
Oklahoma, only municipal employees are covered.50  In Iowa, a recent 
executive order mandates card-check recognition for child-care providers.51 
 
 44. The New Jersey law states: 
Representatives designated or selected by public employees for the purposes of collective 
negotiation by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, by 
the majority of the employees voting in an election conducted by the commission as 
authorized by this act or, at the option of the representative in a case in which the 
commission finds that only one representative is seeking to be the majority representative, 
by a majority of the employees in the unit signing authorization cards indicating their 
preference for that representative, shall be the exclusive representatives for collective 
negotiation concerning the terms and conditions of employment . . . . 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-5.3 (West 2008). 
 45. The Oregon law states: 
Notwithstanding subsection (1) of this section, when an employee, group of employees or 
labor organization acting on behalf of the employees files a petition alleging that a 
majority of employees in a unit appropriate for the purpose of collective bargaining wish 
to be represented by a labor organization for that purpose, the board shall investigate the 
petition. If the board finds that a majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for 
bargaining have signed authorizations designating the labor organization specified in the 
petition as the employees’ bargaining representative and that no other labor organization 
is currently certified or recognized as the exclusive representative of any of the employees 
in the unit, the board may not conduct an election but shall certify the labor organization 
as the exclusive representative unless a petition for a representation election is filed as 
provided in subsection (3) of this section. 
OR. REV. STAT. § 243.682(2)(a) (2007). 
 46. KAN. STAT ANN. § 72-5416(a), (b) (2002). 
 47. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-153b (West 2008). 
 48. MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 6-405(e) (LexisNexis 2008). 
 49. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 15.1-16-07 to 15.1-16-13 (2003 & Supp. 2007). 
 50. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 51-211(B) (West 2010).  In the state of Washington, card 
check recognition (referred to as “cross-checks”) is allowed for some employees if the union 
demonstrates the support of seventy percent of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit.  
WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 391-25-391 to 391-25-416 (2009). 
 51. Iowa Exec. Order No. 45 (Jan. 16, 2006), available at http://publications.iowa.gov/3765/ 
1/EO_45.pdf.  Notice the situation in Iowa is different from the situation of the other states that 
have adopted some form of card-check framework in several respects.  First, unlike the other 
states, the card-check provision was enacted via executive order.  See id.  Second, the child-care 
providers organized under the executive order are entitled only to meet and confer rights, as 
opposed to full collective bargaining rights.  See id.  Finally, the child-care providers are not 
technically public employees, but instead they are considered to be independent providers who 
are deemed employees for purposes of the executive order.  See id. 
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B. Collective Bargaining Laws in Illinois and Ohio 
The history and development of public sector collective bargaining in 
Illinois and Ohio stand in, somewhat, stark contrast to the “crazy-quilt patch 
work” of the developments in other states.52  The two states share remarkably 
similar histories regarding the development of their collective bargaining laws 
and, to a large extent, their collective bargaining statutes are also quite similar. 
In both states, collective bargaining was fairly well established before the 
enactment of comprehensive bargaining laws.53  In Illinois, for example, there 
was a strong tradition of collective bargaining among state government 
employees and K-12 school teachers.54  In fact, opposition by labor in 1967 led 
to the defeat of a comprehensive law which the unions considered to be too 
weak and thus less preferable than the absence of a bill.55  Ohio also enjoyed a 
strong tradition of public sector unionism among school employees, as well as 
municipal employees.56  As in Illinois, the enactment of bargaining laws 
occurred relatively late even though support for the legislation was fairly 
broad.57  Early attempts to enact comprehensive bargaining laws in Ohio were 
impeded by Republican control of the governor’s office.58  The election of 
Governor Richard Celeste, a Democrat, in 1982, paved the way for the 
enactment of the comprehensive bargaining law, which previously had been 
vetoed twice by a Republican governor.59 
In 1983, both Illinois and Ohio enacted comprehensive bargaining laws.60  
Both acts are modeled after the NLRA, and thus share similar features.61  The 
statutes in both states, however, are broader than the NLRA in many respects, 
and also broader than other public sector bargaining laws.  Like the NLRA, 
both the Illinois statute applicable to state and local government employees, 
the Illinois Public Sector Relations Act (“ILPRA”), and the statute applicable 
 
 52. See Saltzman, supra note 16, at 41–42; Ann C. Hodges, Lessons from the Laboratory: 
The Polar Opposites on the Public Sector Law Spectrum, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 735, 
735–37 (2009); James T. O’Reilly, More Magic with Less Smoke: A Ten Year Retrospective on 
Ohio’s Collective Bargaining Law, 19 U. DAYTON L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1993); Hindman & Patton, 
supra note 16, at 107–08. 
 53. See Hindman & Patton, supra note 16, at 107–08. 
 54. Id. 
 55. See Hodges, supra note 52, at 737–38; Hindman & Patton, supra note 16, at 107–08. 
 56. Hindman & Patton, supra note 16, at 107. 
 57. See id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 107–08. 
 60. Illinois enacted two different statutes: the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act 
(“IELRA”), covering educational employees, 115 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-21 (2006), and the 
Illinois Public Sector Relations Act (“IPLRA”), covering state and local government employees, 
5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 315/1-27 (2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117 (West 2003). 
 61. See Hodges, supra note 52, at 738; Bumpass & Ashmus, supra, note 14, at 609; 
Hindman & Patton, supra note 16, at 107. 
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to educational employees, the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act 
(“IELRA”), define the term “supervisor” by listing a series of activities which 
an individual must have the authority to conduct for that individual to be 
considered a supervisor.62  However, unlike the NLRA, the ILPRA and the 
IELRA require that the individual must devote a “preponderance of their 
employment time” to exercising such authority.63  Since individuals who are 
considered supervisors are not considered “employees” and thus are not 
entitled to the rights guaranteed under the acts, a narrower definition of the 
term “supervisor” results in broader coverage.64 
The Ohio public sector bargaining law is also broader than the NLRA in 
some significant respects.65  In some occupational groups, for example, the 
“supervisor” definition has been made inapplicable.66  The Ohio statute 
provides that no one other than the police and fire chiefs are to be considered a 
supervisor, regardless of their duties.67  Another example of the broader nature 
of the Ohio law is found in the definition of the type of conduct that qualifies 
as an unfair labor practice.68  Unlike the NLRA, the Ohio statute makes 
employer lockouts an unfair labor practice.69 
Similarly, there are aspects of the public sector bargaining laws in Illinois 
and Ohio that make them broader than other public sector bargaining statutes.  
For example, the bargaining statutes in Illinois and Ohio protect the rights of 
 
 62. 115 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2(g) (2006) (defining supervisor as “any individual having 
authority in the interests of the employer to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, 
discharge, reward or discipline other employees within the appropriate bargaining unit and adjust 
their grievances . . . .”); 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 315/3(r) (2006) (defining supervisor as “an employee 
whose principal work is substantially different from that of his or her subordinates and who has 
authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, 
discharge, direct, reward, or discipline employees, to adjust their grievances, or to effectively 
recommend any of those actions . . . .”).  This language is substantially the same as that used in 
the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (2006). 
 63. 115 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2(g) (2006) (adding that “[t]he term ‘supervisor’ includes only 
those individuals who devote a preponderance of their employment time to such exercising 
authority.”); 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 315/3(r) (2006) (adding that “[e]xcept with respect to police 
employment, the term ‘supervisor’ includes only those individuals who devote a preponderance 
of their employment time to exercising that authority . . . .”). 
 64. See Hodges, supra note 52, at 738–39, for a more detailed comparison of the Illinois 
statutes and the NLRA. 
 65. See Bumpass & Ashmus, supra note 14, at 616–51 (comparing the various provisions of 
the Ohio statute to the NLRA). 
 66. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.01(F)(2) (West 2003). 
 67. Id. (“With respect to members of a police or fire department, no person shall be deemed 
a supervisor except the chief of the department or those individuals who, in the absence of the 
chief, are authorized to exercise the authority and perform the duties of the chief of the 
department”). 
 68. Bumpass & Ashmus, supra note 14, at 621–23. 
 69. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.11(A)(7) (West 2003). 
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most non-safety related public employees to strike, unlike the majority of 
public sector bargaining statutes in other states.70  Illinois protects the right of 
all employees to strike, excluding police officers, firefighters, paramedics, and 
security personnel.71  A similar protection is included in the Ohio bargaining 
statute.72 
Despite these similarities, there is an important difference between the 
Ohio and Illinois statutes.  Since 2003, Illinois mandates certification of union 
representation on the basis of authorization cards or other similar evidence.73  
The IPLRA requires the agency in charge of enforcing the statutes to 
“designate an exclusive bargaining representative for purposes of collective 
bargaining when the representative demonstrates a showing of majority interest 
by employees in the unit.”74  The section then states that “the Board shall 
ascertain the employees’ choice of employee organization, on the basis of dues 
deduction authorization and other evidence . . . .”75  The IELRA achieves the 
same objective using slightly different statutory language.  Section 7(b) 
provides that “[a]n educational employer shall voluntarily recognize a labor 
organization for collective bargaining purposes if that organization appears to 
represent a majority of employees in the unit.”76 
These sections have been interpreted by the corresponding enforcement 
agencies, the Illinois Labor Relations Board for the ILPRA and the Illinois 
Educational Labor Relations Board for the IELRA, as requiring the union to 
file a “majority interest petition,” that is, a representation petition 
“accompanied by a showing of interest evidencing that a majority of the 
employees in the petitioned-for bargaining unit wish to be represented by the 
labor organization.”77  Under the regulations, the showing of interest in support 
of the majority interest petition “may consist of authorization cards, petitions, 
or any other evidence that demonstrates that a majority of the employees wish 
to be represented by the union for the purposes of collective bargaining.”78  
 
 70. See Hodges, supra note 52, at 738; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §4117.14(D)(2) (West 2003). 
 71. See Hodges, supra note 52, at 738. 
 72. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §4117.14(D)(2) (West 2003).  For a detailed comparison of the 
strike provisions in Illinois and Ohio, see Martin H. Malin, Public Employees’ Right to Strike: 
Law and Experience, 26 U. MICH. J. L REFORM 313, 336–48 (1993). 
 73. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 315/9(a-5) (2008). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. 115 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7(b) (2008). 
 77. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 80, § 1210.80(b) (2010). 
 78. Id. § 1210.80(d)(2)(A); id. § 1110.105.  The validity of this rule has been the subject of 
litigation.  In Cnty. of Du Page v. Ill. Labor Relations Bd., 900 N.E.2d 1095, 1104–5 (Ill. 2008), 
the Illinois Supreme Court held that the word “and,” as used in the phrase “dues deduction 
authorization and other evidence,” was intended by the legislature to mean “or.”  Accordingly, the 
court found the state board can proceed to certify a union that otherwise satisfies the requirements 
of the statute on the basis of authorization cards only, or of some other evidence.  Id. 
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Following the filing of a majority interest petition, the employer is required to 
post a notice informing employees that a petition has been filed with the 
appropriate agency and informing employees of the intervention procedures 
provided under the specific statute.79  The employer is then required to provide 
the enforcing agency with “a list containing the full names and titles of the 
employees in the proposed bargaining unit, along with signature exemplars.”80  
The regulations then require the Board to certify a union that enjoys majority 
support, absent clear and convincing evidence of fraud or coercion, or other 
unit appropriateness or exclusion issues.81 
Ohio, on the other hand, allows, but does not mandate, recognition on the 
basis of card checks.  Under the Ohio statute and the corresponding 
regulations, the state agency is required to certify the union as the exclusive 
representative unless, before the twenty-second day after a petition for 
recognition is filed with the Board and served upon the employer, any of the 
following events occur: the employer files a petition for election, the state 
employment relations board receives substantial evidence that a majority of 
employees in the proposed unit do not wish to be represented by the employee 
organization that filed the recognition request, another labor organization 
demonstrates support from at least ten percent of the employees in the 
proposed unit, or the state board receives substantial evidence that the 
proposed unit is not appropriate.82 
Consequently, in Ohio, the union will be certified unless either the 
employer affirmatively responds to the petition for recognition or unless 
substantial evidence is presented indicating a lack of support or the 
inappropriateness of the bargaining unit.83  Although this process allows the 
employer to fairly easily avoid having the union certified through the use of 
card checks by just filing a petition for an election, it still places a burden on 
the employer to take action to prevent the state employment board from 
certifying the union without an election.84  In the absence of some other party 
 
 79. tit. 80, § 1210.100(b)(1); id. § 1110.90. 
 80. tit. 80, § 1210.100 (b)(2). 
 81. Id. § 1210.100(b)(5), (7); id. § 1110.105(e). 
 82. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.05(A)(2)(b) (West 2003); OHIO ADMIN. CODE 4117-5-
10(B) (2011). 
 83. Ohio Ass’n of Pub. Sch. Employees v. Warren Cnty. Bd. of Mental Retardation & 
Developmental Disabilities, SERB HO 1996-HO-004 (3-21-96) (noting that a party who objects 
to the employee organization’s petitioned-for unit has the burden to show by substantial evidence 
that the objectionable unit is inappropriate, but where the employer files a petition for a 
representation election in response to a union request for recognition the Board will not certify the 
unit without first conducting an election, even if the petitioned-for unit is found appropriate). 
 84. Soon after the Ohio statute was enacted, there was some commentary and case law 
suggesting that if there was no question regarding the appropriateness of the bargaining unit, the 
state board was mandated to recognize the union unless the employer provided substantial 
evidence that the majority of employees did not want representation.  See Bumpass & Ashmus, 
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raising an objection, failure by the employer to petition for an election will 
result in card-check recognition.85  Thus, while the Ohio statute does not 
mandate card-check recognition, it establishes a process under which, 
following a union petition for recognition, the card-check process becomes an 
almost default process absent action by the employer to the contrary. 
Given their similar histories regarding public sector collective bargaining, 
it is not surprising that Illinois and Ohio also have very similar levels and 
trends in unionization rates.  This is clearly illustrated in Figure 186 for the 
twenty-five year period from 1983 through 2008. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
At the time their collective bargaining laws were passed, Illinois and Ohio 
had public sector union density rates that ranked them 20th and 18th, 
respectively, relative to other states.87  But in the years since their laws were 
passed, both experienced moderate gains in public sector unionization.  Today, 
Illinois and Ohio have public sector union density rates that rank 14th and 18th 
among other states.88  It is also noteworthy that the trend lines in Figure 1 
suggest that from 2004 to 2008 the level of public sector union organizing 
activity in Illinois was consistently higher than in Ohio, a fact that is confirmed 
 
supra note 14, at 628–29.  Later, case law rejects this view.  See Ohio Ass’n of Pub. Sch. 
Employees, SERB HO 1996-HO-004. 
 85. See Ohio Ass’n of Pub. Sch. Employees, SERB HO 1996-HO-004. 
 86. Barry T. Hirsch & David A. Macpherson, Union Membership and Coverage Database 
from the CPS, UNIONSTATS.COM (last visited Mar. 7, 2011).  The data comes from the tables 
under the heading “State: Union Membership, Coverage, Density, and Employment by State and 
Sector, 1983-2010.” 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 
Figure 1: Union Density Rates, Illinois and Ohio
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in Figures 2 and 3.89  Of course, this period corresponds to the years following 
the enactment of the Illinois card-check legislation. 
III.  THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
A. A “Structural Approach” to Union Organizing Rules 
In a recent article in the Harvard Law Review, Professor Benjamin Sachs 
develops what he refers to as a “structural approach” to understanding union 
organizing rules.90  Professor Sachs starts by noting that the debate regarding 
the proposed EFCA in particular, and the question of union organizing rules 
more generally, can be understood as a situation where a decision-maker (e.g., 
a legislature or a court) has to choose a default rule related to the 
union/nonunion status of the workplace.  In making this choice, the decision-
maker seeks to maximize “the satisfaction of some relevant preference set.”91 
Relying on theories of statutory interpretation and corporate law, Professor 
Sachs notes that in situations where a decision-maker knows with certainty 
which default rule (i.e., policy) will maximize public satisfaction, the decision-
maker ought to choose that policy.92  However, where there is uncertainty as to 
the default rule that will maximize the preferences of the public, a decision-
maker must then consider the extent to which, once enacted, those affected by 
the policy are able to opt out of the default rule and choose instead a non-
default alternative.93  The opting out option is important, as it is conducive to 
preference maximization. 
Professor Sachs identifies two ways in which a decision-maker could 
maximize “the good sought” by a default rule.94  A decision-maker could 
choose the default rule which can be more easily circumvented by the 
parties—a “preference-eliciting” or “reversible” default rule.95  Such a rule, 
notes Professor Sachs, is appropriate in situations where there is uncertainty 
regarding the preferences of those affected by the rule, and where there is 
“asymmetric ability to depart from the default [rule].”96  Alternatively, if 
practical or political considerations made it difficult to change the default rule, 
a decision-maker could instead adopt what Professor Sachs coins an 
“asymmetry-correcting altering rule”97—a rule which alters the process by 
 
 89. See infra note 120 and accompanying text. 
 90. See Sachs, supra note 9. 
 91. Id. at 658. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 672–79. 
 94. Id. at 673. 
 95. Id. at 659. 
 96. See Sachs, supra note 9, at 680. 
 97. Id. at 679. 
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which the parties can depart from the default rule, making it easy to avoid the 
default rule.98 
In the labor law context, the basic policy choice is that of deciding 
whether, as a default rule, workplaces will be unionized or non-unionized.99  
Under U.S. labor law, employees operate under a nonunion environment, 
unless they decide to organize collectively.  Professor Sachs argues, however, 
that it is not clear that a nonunion default rule is preference maximizing.100  He 
acknowledges that it is true that there is ex-ante uncertainty about whether 
employees in general prefer union representation and, thus, that either rule, a 
union or a nonunion default rule, is initially justifiable.  When there is 
uncertainty as to which default rule is preferred, one should identify the rule 
that can be more easily opted out of by the parties.  That is, is it easier for 
employees to opt out of a nonunion representation default rule (as is currently 
the case) or a union representation default rule? 
In addition, Professor Sachs argues that some structural barriers exist; for 
example, a variety of collective action problems and strong managerial 
opposition to union representation make it very hard for employees to opt out 
of a nonunion representation default rule.  The same structural barriers, 
however, do not necessarily affect the ability of employees to opt out of union 
representation.  Therefore, Professor Sachs concludes that a default rule, which 
requires union representation, makes utility maximizing sense.101 
The question then becomes, “how to structure the rules governing 
organizing campaigns in a manner that maximizes the satisfaction of employee 
preferences on the union question.”102  Professor Sachs advances two 
approaches.  First, the labor law default rule could be changed from nonunion 
to a default union representation.103  Although Professor Sachs appears to be 
sympathetic to this approach, he ultimately rejects it as both more complex and 
politically unlikely.104  Alternatively, labor law could leave the default rule 
unchanged, but instead adopt a new “asymmetry correcting altering rule.”  The 
goal of such a rule would be to facilitate the process by which parties affected 
by the default rule, in this case a nonunion workplace, can opt out of the 
default.  In the context of union organizing, Professor Sachs notes such a rule 
 
 98. Id. at 659. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 680. 
 102. See Sachs, supra note 9, at 680. 
 103. More precisely, the choices are between a change in the default rule and an 
accompanying adoption of an altering rule, on the one hand, or staying with the existing default 
rule, and adopting an altering rule, on the other hand.  Id. at 694. 
 104. Id. at 695–96. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
494 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXX:475 
should have the goal of minimizing management’s ability to intervene in the 
employee organizing process.105 
Professor Sachs then evaluates various alternative organizing 
technologies—rapid elections,106 confidential phone or internet voting,107 and 
continuous early voting108—concluding that the latter two preserve secrecy 
while at the same time “enabling employees to minimize managerial 
intervention in the union organizing process.”109 
B. Implications of the Structural Model 
Professor Sachs’ structural model provides a framework that allows us to 
identify how a card-check statute, such as the one enacted in Illinois, is likely 
to affect unionization activity among public employees.110  Three specific 
implications flow from his model. 
First, the Illinois card-check statute implements what Professor Sachs 
refers to as an asymmetry-correcting altering rule that intends to better enable 
employees to opt out of the nonunion default rule.  Accordingly, we should 
expect the Illinois statute to facilitate union organizing and, thus, result in 
higher levels of organizing activity. 
Second, while not explored by Professor Sachs, the adoption of altering 
rules, such as card-check legislation, should impact labor unions’ choices of 
organizing methods.  One would expect that unions will gravitate towards 
“organizing technologies”111 which facilitate the organizing process.  Thus, the 
enactment of the card-check statute should have prompted public sector unions 
in Illinois to shift their organizing strategies towards the use of card checks 
rather than elections. 
Finally, Professor Sachs’ structural model suggests that under the existing 
nonunion default rule, with no asymmetry-correcting altering rule, workplaces 
 
 105. Id. at 693–94. 
 106. Id. at 718–20. 
 107. See id. at 720–23. 
 108. Sachs, supra note 9, at 723–27. 
 109. Id. at 728. 
 110. To be sure, Professor Sachs develops his model in the private sector context, where 
employers have actively opposed union organizing efforts.  Professor Sachs’ model is partially 
based on the argument that a different default rule is needed as a way of responding to the strong 
anti-union stance of private sector employers.  Given that public sector employers have been less 
likely to oppose union organizing efforts, and given that even in the absence of union 
representation public sector employees usually enjoy the protections provided by state’s civil 
service laws, one could question the need to change the default rule (from a non-union to a union 
rule) or the need to adopt asymmetry correcting altering rules (such as card checks).  Our claim 
here, however, is not that the structural model provides a justification for adopting card-check 
legislation in the public sector.  Instead, we look at the structural model to provide guidance 
regarding the effects that such legislation is likely to have once it is adopted. 
 111. Sachs, supra note 9, at 671. 
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where workers might prefer union representation might not yet be organized.  
That is, in the absence of a union-representation default rule and in the absence 
of an altering rule that facilitates opting out of the nonunion default rule, one 
would expect there to be workplaces where employees might prefer union 
representation but where such representation has not yet been achieved.112  
One might also expect those workplaces to share some similar characteristics, 
which perhaps explains the inability of certain types of employees to have 
previously achieved union representation.113  If this is the case, following the 
adoption of a card-check statute, one would likely observe unions organizing 
not only new workplaces, but also new types of workplaces. 
IV.  OVERVIEW OF PUBLIC SECTOR UNION ORGANIZING IN ILLINOIS AND OHIO 
A. Overview 
We begin our analysis by describing the levels of public sector organizing 
activity in Illinois and Ohio over the ten year period from 1999 through 2008.  
Data on organizing events were collected from annual reports of the Illinois 
Labor Relations Board and the Ohio State Employment Relations Board, 
respectively.114  These reports provide fairly detailed information on union 
organizing events, including data on the governmental unit being organized, 
the types of bargaining units (i.e., the type of employees who are the target of 
the organizing campaign), the number of employees in each bargaining unit, 
the union(s) seeking representation rights, the event type (election vs. card 
check), and voter turnout (Ohio only).115 
B. Trends and Levels of Public Sector Organizing Activity 
As shown in Table 1, there were 1,265 organizing events in Illinois and 
865 in Ohio from 1999 through 2008.  Table 1 shows more card check events 
(666) than elections (599) in Illinois.  In contrast, there were more than two 
and a half times as many elections (623) as card checks (242) in Ohio.  In both 
 
 112. For example, workplaces where a representation gap exists. 
 113. For example, these workplaces might be ones where employers tend to be more resistant 
to union organizing efforts, or where collective action problems (of the kind described by 
Professor Sachs) tend to be more acute. 
 114. ILLINOIS LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, ANNUAL REPORTS (1999–2004) (on file with 
author); ILLINOIS LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, ANNUAL REPORTS (2005–2008), available at 
http://www.state.il.us/ilrb/subsections/publications/index.asp (last visited Mar. 7, 2011); STATE 
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD, ANNUAL REPORTS (1999–2003) (on file with author); STATE 
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD, ANNUAL REPORTS (2004–2008), available at 
http://www.serb.ohio.gov/publications.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2011). 
 115. Below we confine our discussion to organizing events, namely elections and card checks, 
involving non-educational public sector employees. 
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states, union win rates in representation elections were very high, 
approximately 90% for elections. 
Table 1116 
Levels of Elections and Card Checks and Union Win Rates, 1999-2008 
 Illinois  Ohio 
Organizing Events  1265   865 
Elections  599   623 
Union Win Rate (%)  87.6  89.4 
Card Checks  666   242 
Union Win Rate (%)  100   100 
 
In Figures 2117 and 3118, we show trends in representation elections and 
card-check organizing events involving public sector employees in Illinois and 
Ohio for years 1999 through 2008.119  The most obvious difference across the 
two states is the dramatic change in organizing events in Illinois following the 
enactment of card-check legislation.120  Of the 1,265 reported events, 732 
(58%) occurred after 2003.  The vast majority of these events (588) were card-
check authorizations.  In fact, approximately 88% of the 666 card check 
organizing events in Illinois occurred after the passage of card-check 
legislation.  In contrast, the distribution between elections and card-check 
organizing in Ohio changed only slightly over time (Figure 3).  Pre-2004 card-
check organizing constituted 27% of all organizing events compared to 30% 
 
 116. Data comes from sources cited supra note 114. 
 117. Data comes from sources cited supra note 114. 
 118. Data comes from sources cited supra note 114. 
 119. Our data also allow us to identify the labor organizations most actively involved in 
organizing campaigns during this period.  Three of the top 5 unions in terms of elections and card 
check organizing were the same for Illinois and Ohio—namely the American Federation of State, 
County and Municipal Employees (“AFSCME”), which is the largest union representing public 
sector workers in the United States, the Fraternal Order of Police (“FOP”), which is a major 
police union in the nation, and the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (“IBT”), a union 
which has increasingly expanded its organizing activity outside its historic focus on the trucking 
industry.  Since we only observe events that were reported by each states’ employee relations 
board, we do not know whether these unions initiated union organizing within the states or were 
involved because of the types of employees who actively sought union representation (i.e., when 
protective service employees want to unionize a protective service union is involved). 
 120. In 2005, Illinois also enacted legislation that reduced the number of employees an 
employer must have to be covered by the IPLRA from 35 to 5.  Pub. Act 93-1080, § 5, 2004 Ill. 
Legis. Serv. 3530, 3531 (West) (codified as amended 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 315/20 (2008)).  While 
this change would seem to open many new organizing opportunities for unions which might also 
explain the recent increase in organizing activity among Illinois’ public employees, analyses of 
our data show no significant differences between bargaining unit sizes in Illinois pre- and post-
2005. 
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after 2003.  The trends in Ohio show slight overall decreases in the numbers of 
elections and card-check organizing events over time. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Illinois Organizing Events
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Figure 3: Ohio Organizing Events
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V.  MEASURING THE IMPACT OF CARD CHECK LEGISLATION 
The data described in the prior section indicate some clear differences in 
both the levels and the types of organizing activity in Illinois and Ohio.  As 
noted earlier, the passage of Illinois’ card-check legislation gave public sector 
workers the right to union representation via card-check authorization.  The 
most obvious impact of this legislation is an increase in union organizing 
activity and a redistribution of organizing events from elections to card checks.  
These findings suggest that it may have become easier to achieve 
representation rights after the card-check law was passed and unions responded 
by increasing their organizing efforts through card-check authorization 
attempts.  In this section we provide a more in-depth comparison of Illinois 
and Ohio before and after the implementation of Illinois’s 2003 card-check 
legislation. 
The impact of the Illinois card-check legislation is examined using two key 
comparisons: a time-series and a cross-sectional comparison.  To show how 
the legislation altered the organizing landscape in Illinois, we compare public 
sector union organizing events across two time periods—the five years prior to 
the enactment of the Illinois card check legislation (1999-2003) and the five 
years after the legislation was enacted (2004-2008).121  In particular, we 
examine the government levels at which the organizing events occurred, the 
types of employees who were the target of union organizing (i.e., the 
bargaining units), and the numbers of employees involved in the organizing 
events. 
In addition to this time-series comparison, we also compare the Illinois 
experience to the experience in Ohio during the same two time periods.  As 
described above,122 the bargaining laws in Ohio and Illinois shared very similar 
features.  One would thus expect that union organizing activity in both states 
might also be similar.  Indeed, that is what we found prior to 2004.  The cross-
sectional comparison to Ohio thus serves as a baseline with which to evaluate 
the effects of the Illinois legislation. 
 
 121. The tables used for these analyses include only cases for which there were no missing 
data on the variables of interest.  This resulted in the loss of some election and card check 
observations included in Table 1 and Figures 2 and 3. 
 122. See supra Part II.B. 
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A. A Comparison of Organizing Events in Illinois and Ohio, Pre-2004 
Table 2 shows the distribution of organizing events across various levels of 
government for Illinois and Ohio from 1999 through 2003,123 while Table 3 
shows the distribution of organizing events by type of public employees.124  In 
general, the results indicate that during the period preceding Illinois’ card-
check statute, both states were fairly similar in terms of their public sector 
union organizing experiences. 
The top panel in Table 2 shows that between 1999 and 2003 there were 
very similar numbers of organizing events in each state, 438 in Illinois versus 
447 in Ohio.  In both states, the majority of events occurred at the city level.  
In fact, the percentages of city level organizing for the two states were not 
significantly different (61.0% in Illinois and 56.4% in Ohio).  Table 2 also 
demonstrates that elections were the most common form of union organizing 
for public sector employees at all levels of government in both states (84.0% 
and 78.5% of all organizing events were elections in Illinois and Ohio, 
respectively).  However, significantly different rates of election activity 
occurred at the city, county, and state levels.  With regard to card checks, 
Table 2 indicates that during the five years prior to the enactment of card-
check legislation in Illinois, Ohio had nearly 40% more card-check events than 
Illinois (96 versus 70).  This appears to have been largely driven by 
significantly higher rates of card-check activity at the city level in Ohio.  In 
fact, card checks represented a significantly higher percentage of state level 
organizing events in Illinois than in Ohio, although the total number of such 
events was quite small in both states. 
 
 123. We distinguish between three levels of government: state, county and city.  We rely on 
the employer name, as reported in the various reports, to classify the governmental level. 
 124. We distinguish between five types of bargaining units: “White Collar”; “Blue Collar”; 
“Firefighter”; “Safety”; “Multi-Employee.”  The sources cited supra note 114 provided 
information as to the type of employees involved which formed the basis for these categories.  
“White Collar” includes administrative and clerical employees, social workers, court personnel, 
and health care workers.  “Blue Collar” includes custodial employees, public works employees, 
laborers, and maintenance employees.  “Firefighter” and “Safety” include employees in fire and 
police departments respectively.  “Multi-Employee” includes bargaining units of employees in 
mixed job categories. 
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Table 2125 
Comparing Organizing Events by Level of Government, 1999-2003 
 Illinois  Ohio 
Organizing Events 438  447 
City 267 (61.0)  252 (56.4) 
County 128 (29.2)  177 (39.6)* 
State  43 (9.8)  18 (4.0)* 
Card Checks  70 (16.0)  96 (21.5)* 
City  45 (10.3)  73 (16.3)* 
County  15 (3.4)  21 (4.7) 
State  10 (2.3)  2 (.4)* 
Elections 368 (84.0)  351 (78.5)* 
City 222 (50.7)  179 (40.0)* 
County 113 (25.8)  156 (34.9)* 
State  33 (7.5)  16 (3.6)* 
* Significant at p<.05.  Numbers in parenthesis represent percentage out of the 
total number of organizing events in each state. 
As for the types of employees who were organized during this period, data 
presented in Table 3 provide further evidence of similarities between the two 
states.  For example, in both states, safety employees were the most frequent 
participants in organizing events, but the percentage of organizing events 
involving safety employees was significantly higher in Ohio than Illinois.  No 
significant differences in the proportions of organizing events were detected 
for three of the remaining four categories of bargaining unit types (firefighters, 
blue collar, and units including different types of employees).  However, there 
is a large and significant difference between Illinois and Ohio in the percentage 
of organizing events involving white-collar employees; white-collar workers 
were the target of more than two times as many organizing events in Illinois 
than in Ohio. 
For all types of employees, elections were the most common type of 
organizing method.126  As was true for organizing events in general, significant 
differences between the states were observed for elections involving white-
collar employees (more prevalent in Illinois) and safety workers (more 
prevalent in Ohio).  Card-check events, though relatively rare for all types of 
public employees, represented a significantly higher percentage of organizing 
events for white-collar employees in Illinois compared to Ohio, and a 
 
 125. Data comes from sources cited supra note 114. 
 126. Interestingly, the percentages of elections and card checks for Ohio firefighters were 
nearly the same.  For all other employee groups, elections constitute a much higher percentage of 
organizing events than card checks in both states. 
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significantly higher percentage for safety and firefighter personnel in Ohio 
compared to Illinois. 
Finally, data in Table 3 show the numbers of employees organized in each 
state from 1999 to 2003 and the numbers organized through elections and card 
checks.  While many more employees were organized in Ohio than Illinois, the 
difference is largely the result of one very large unit of state employees in Ohio 
(32,246).  If that one observation is omitted, the numbers of employees are 
similar (13,795 for Illinois and 13,581 for Ohio).  In fact, none of the states’ 
differences in the numbers of employees organized per event are statistically 
significant. 
Table 3127 
Comparing Organizing Events by Types of Public Sector Employees, 1999-2003 
 Illinois  Ohio  
Organizing Events  438  447 
White Collar  122 (27.8)  52 (11.6)* 
Firefighter  48 (11.0)  55 (13.8) 
Safety  163 (37.2)  235 (52.6)* 
Blue Collar  79 (18.0)  75 (16.8) 
Multi-Employee  26 (5.9)  30 (6.7) 
Number of Employees  13,795 
 31.5 per event 
45,827 [13,581] 
 103.4 [30.4] per event 
Card Checks  70 (16.0)  96 (21.5)* 
White Collar  30 (6.8)   13 (2.9)* 
Firefighter  9 (2.0)  24 (5.4)* 
Safety  10 (2.3)  44 (9.8)* 
Blue Collar  16 (3.6)  9 (2.0) 
Multi-Employee  5 (1.1)  6 (1.3) 
Number of Employees  1,093 
 15.6 per card check 
34,130 [1,884] 
 355.5 [19.8] per card  check 
Elections  368 (84.0)  351 (78.5)* 
White Collar  92 (21)  39 (8.7)* 
Firefighter  39 (8.9)  31 (6.9) 
Safety  153 (34.9)  191 (42.7)* 
Blue Collar  63 (14.4)  66 (14.8) 
Multi-Employee  21 (4.8)  24 (5.4) 
Number of Employees  12,702 
 34.5 per election 
11,697 
 33.3 per election 
* Significant at p<.05.  Numbers in parenthesis represent percentage out of the 
total number of organizing events in each state; numbers in brackets were 
calculated without the large Ohio bargaining unit. 
 
 127. Data comes from sources cited supra note 114. 
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Thus, the results in Tables 2 and 3 indicate that from 1999 to 2003, a 
period during which Illinois and Ohio operated under similar collective 
bargaining statutes, the two states shared many similarities in their experiences 
with union organizing activity: unions were very successful in their organizing 
drives, they did not differ much in their overall levels of organizing activity, 
elections were more common than card checks, and safety employees were the 
most frequently organized employee group.  However, some significant 
differences were observed between the two states in their distribution of 
organizing activity across various types of employees and levels of 
government.  Perhaps most germane for our purposes is the finding that card-
check organizing was significantly more common in Ohio than in Illinois. 
B. A Comparison of Organizing Events in Illinois and Ohio, Post-2003 
Having established some of the similarities and differences exhibited 
between Illinois and Ohio in their public sector organizing experiences during 
the five year period preceding the enactment of the Illinois card-check statute, 
this section explores the effects of the legislation.  Two comparisons can be 
made using data from Illinois and Ohio post-2003—identifying changes that 
occurred within the two states relative to the prior five year period, as well as 
examining differences across the states after 2003.  Because our primary 
interest is to explore the effects of the Illinois mandatory card-check statute, 
we will focus primarily on the former, although differences between Illinois 
and Ohio for the post-2003 period are also highlighted. 
Comparing Tables 4 and 2, several interesting changes are evident within 
each state.  First, the number of organizing events in Illinois increased by 55% 
relative to the prior five year period (from 438 to 681).  This, combined with a 
decline in organizing events in Ohio (from 447 to 320), led to dramatic 
differences between the two states in their overall numbers of organizing 
events.  In fact, as seen in Table 4, the number of organizing events in Illinois 
exceeded Ohio’s across all levels of government.  However, the basic pattern 
seen in Table 2 remains; most organizing events in both states occurred at the 
city level and notable differences between the two states were observed in the 
percentage of all organizing events that occurred at the county and state levels. 
The post-2003 developments are clearly driven by the dramatic increase in 
card-check organizing in Illinois.  After 2003, Ohio no longer led Illinois in 
public sector card-check organizing activity, and the change was 
overwhelming.  From 2004 to 2008 there were more than seven times as many 
card-check events in Illinois than in Ohio, and significant differences were 
observed at all levels of government.  Card-check organizing accounted for 
nearly 76% of all Illinois organizing events compared to 16% for 1999-
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2003.128  For Ohio, the distribution of organizing events between card checks 
and elections remained virtually unchanged across the two time periods. 
Data in Table 4 also provide evidence that Illinois experienced not only an 
increase in the level of organizing activity but also a shift in the preferred 
method of organizing public employees.  In Illinois, only 44% as many 
elections occurred in 2004-2008 compared to 1999-2003.  In contrast, the 
decline in organizing activity in Ohio was relatively equal for both card checks 
and elections.  These trends explain why the percentage of organizing events 
that were elections is significantly higher in Ohio compared to Illinois at all 
levels of government.  The opposite is true for card checks. 
Table 4129 
Comparing Organizing Events by Level of Government, 2004-2008 
 Illinois Ohio 
Organizing Events  681  320 
City  385 (56.7)  181 (56.6) 
County  133 (19.5)  115 (35.9)* 
State  163 (23.9)  24 (7.5)* 
Card Checks  518 (76.1)  70 (21.9)* 
City  292 (42.8)  43 (13.4)* 
County  88 (12.9)  27 (8.4)* 
State  138 (20.3)  0 (0%)* 
Elections  163 (23.9)  250 (78.1)* 
City  93 (13.6)  138 (43.1)* 
County  45 (6.6)  88 (27.5)* 
State  25 (3.7)  24 (7.5)* 
* Significant at p<.05.  Numbers in parenthesis represent percentage out of the 
total number of organizing events in each state. 
When examining Table 5, we see more significant differences between 
Illinois and Ohio in the distribution of organizing events across public 
 
 128. The dramatic increase in card-check activity in Illinois is particularly interesting given 
that for about 16 months (from August 2007 to December 2008) the validity of the card-check 
statute was subject to a court challenge.  In August of 2007, an Illinois appellate court found the 
state agency’s rules regarding the type of evidence that needed to be submitted supporting a card-
check request to be invalid.  Cnty. of Du Page v. Ill. Labor Relations Bd., 874 N.E.2d 319 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 2007), rev’d, 900 N.E.2d 1095 (Ill. 2008).  The appellate court found that both evidence 
of “dues deduction authorization and other evidence” needed to be submitted in support of a card-
check request.  Id. at 329.  Although the court was ultimately reversed by the Illinois Supreme 
Court in December of 2008, during the period preceding the reversal by the state Supreme Court, 
the appellate court’s decision made it more burdensome for unions to utilize the card-check 
process.  Absent the type of legal challenge raised in County of Du Page, unions might have been 
even more inclined to use the card-check process. 
 129. Data comes from sources cited supra note 114. 
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employee groups for 2004-2008 than we did for the prior five-year period.  
Also, while a comparison of Tables 5 and 3 show organizing activity in Ohio 
declined for nearly all the categories of public employees included in the 
analysis (except multi-unit which increased slightly), in Illinois, organizing 
increased for nearly all the categories of public employees included in the 
analysis (except multi-employee which decreased). 
Table 5130 
Comparing Organizing Events by Types of Public Sector Employees, 2004-2008 
 Illinois  Ohio 
Organizing Events  681  320 
White Collar  283 (41.6)  45 (14.1)* 
Firefighter  52 (7.6)  31 (9.7) 
Safety  213 (31.3)  160 (50.0)* 
Blue Collar  119 (17.5)  46 (14.4) 
Multi-Employee  14 (2.1)  38 (11.9)* 
Number of Employees 21,881 
 32.1 per event 
16,027 
 50.1 per event 
Card Checks  518 (76.1%)  70 (21.9)* 
White Collar  235 (34.5)  9 (2.8)* 
Firefighter  38 (5.6)  17 (5.3) 
Safety  134 (19.7)  30 (9.4)* 
Blue Collar  100 (14.7)  8 (2.5)* 
Multi-Employee  11 (2.1)  6 (1.9) 
Number of Employees 10,839 
 20.9 per card check 
 2,689 
 38.4 per card check* 
Elections  163   250  
White Collar  48 (7.0)  36 (11.3)* 
Firefighter  14 (2.1)  14 (4.4) 
Safety  79 (11.6)  130 (40.6)* 
Blue Collar  19 (2.8)  38 (11.9)* 
Multi-Employee  3 (.4)  32 (10.0)* 
Number of Employees 11,042 
 67.7 per election 
13,338 
 53.4 per election 
* Significant at p<.05.  Numbers in parenthesis represent percentage out of the 
total number of organizing events in each state. 
A comparison of Tables 5 and 3 further reveals dramatic increases in card 
checks and declining numbers of elections for all public employee types in 
Illinois.  Less dramatic changes were observed over time for Ohio; however, 
the general trend showed decline in both elections and card checks for each of 
the various public employee groups.  Consequently, card checks comprised a 
significantly larger percentage of organizing events for all public employee 
 
 130. Data comes from sources cited supra note 114. 
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types in Illinois compared to Ohio, except firefighters and multi-employee.  In 
fact, firefighters are the only employee group for which significant differences 
between the states are not observed. 
As for the numbers of employees organized, the numbers in Illinois 
exceeded that in Ohio for card checks, but not elections.  However, the average 
number of employees per card-check event was significantly higher in Ohio as 
compared to Illinois.  Comparing the results across time demonstrates that 
nearly ten times as many Illinois public sector employees were organized via 
card check in 2004-2008 than in 1999-2003.  Illinois also experienced a nearly 
13% decrease in the number of employees participating in elections.  If we 
exclude the one very large unit in Ohio from the 1999-2003 data, we find an 
approximate 50% increase in the number of employees who were organized 
via card check and a modest increase in the number of employees who 
participated in representation elections.131 
VI.  A QUALITATIVE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC SECTOR UNION 
ORGANIZING CAMPAIGNS 
A. Overview 
The results in the prior section comparing organizing activity across time 
and states clearly indicate Illinois’ card-check statute influenced the amount 
and type of organizing activities across a number of different contextual 
factors.  Not only did the card-check law result in more organizing activity, 
primarily through card-checks, but the data also demonstrate that increases in 
organizing activity occurred at different levels of government and among 
different types of employees. 
In this section, we further explore the effects of the Illinois statute by 
examining whether the changes identified above follow particular patterns.  
For instance, our prior analysis shows that following the enactment of the card-
check statute, Illinois experienced more card-check organizing at all levels of 
government and among most types of employees.  However, the prior analysis 
does not reveal how these changes occur in combination with one another.  For 
example, did increases in city level card-check organizing tend to occur in 
combination with increases in card-check organizing among white-collar 
employees?  In this section, we explore this issue using an empirical technique 
which has become popular in research examining a variety of social 
phenomena—Qualitative Comparative Analysis (“QCA”).  The next 
 
 131. The results in Tables 3 and 5 also show that in both states unions were organizing more 
employees per organizing event.  For example, from 1999 to 2003, in Illinois the average number 
of employees per election event was 34.5, while in the later period that number was 67.7.  In 
Ohio, the average number of employees involved in elections went from 33.3 to 53.4. 
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subsection provides a brief explanation of QCA.  We then present and discuss 
the results derived from applying this analytical technique. 
B. A Brief QCA Primer 
QCA is an analytical technique that uses logical case comparisons to 
identify combinations of factors that relate to an outcome of interest.132  QCA 
is based on the assumption that the influence of explanatory variables must be 
analyzed in combination, rather than in isolation from one another.133  Because 
QCA explores the effect that variables exert in combination with other 
variables, its focus is on identifying combinations which parsimoniously 
explain particular outcomes, rather than the effect of a particular variable on 
that outcome.134  As compared to more traditional quantitative techniques (e.g., 
regression analysis), which focus on identifying the effect of variables in 
isolation from one another, QCA allows for both “causal complexity and 
inductive sensitivity.”135  Furthermore, unlike more traditional qualitative 
approaches (e.g., case studies), QCA provides more rigorous methodological 
discipline.136 
QCA has been used to analyze a variety of phenomena.  For example, 
QCA has been used to identify the combination of factors associated with 
police officers’ decisions regarding which sexual assault complaints to 
investigate,137employers’ decisions on promotions to supervisory positions,138 
and workers’ decisions to engage in forms of worker resistance.139  QCA has 
also been used to identify the conditions that facilitated or inhibited legislative 
action (i.e., legislature’s decision to enact a law).140 
For this study, we are interested in identifying the contextual 
characteristics surrounding public sector union organizing campaigns.  Given 
complexities in the organizing process that give rise to the use of either 
elections or card checks to determine union representation, it is quite likely that 
 
 132. Danielle M. Soulliere, Pathways to Attrition: A Qualitative Comparative Analysis of 
Justifications for Police Designations of Sexual Assault Complaints, 10 QUALITATIVE REP. 416, 
423 (2005), available at http://www.nova.edu/ssss/QR/QR10-3/soulliere.pdf; Michael C. 
Musheno et al., Court Management of AIDS Disputes: A Sociolegal Analysis, 16 LAW & SOC. 
INQUIRY 737, 753 (1991). 
 133. Soulliere, supra note 132, at 423. 
 134. Musheno et al., supra note 132, at 752. 
 135. Soulliere, supra note 132, at 424. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 416. 
 138. See, e.g., Charles C. Ragin et al., Assessing Discrimination: A Boolean Approach, 49 
AM. SOC. REV. 221 (1984). 
 139. See, e.g., Vincent J. Roscigno & Randy Hodson, The Organizational and Social 
Foundations of Worker Resistance, 69 AM. SOC. REV. 14 (2004). 
 140. See, e.g., Steven Harkreader & Allen W. Imershein, The Conditions for State Action in 
Florida’s Health-Care Market, 40 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 159 (1999). 
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the use of card-check authorization versus elections depends on the presence of 
several conditions in combination.  Applying QCA to our data allows us to 
explore the combinations of conditions that are present when one or the other 
organizing processes was used in Illinois and Ohio for the years 1999 to 2008. 
While application of QCA varies in different contexts, two essential steps 
are generally required.  First, one selects the outcome of interest (i.e., the 
phenomena under analysis) and the relevant causal conditions (or factors) 
associated with that outcome.141  Second, a “truth table” is constructed which 
lists all unique combinations of the various explanatory factors found in the 
data, as well as the outcome associated with that combination.142  From the 
information provided in the truth table, one can identify the frequency with 
which the various combinations occur and the extent to which those 
combinations are associated with unique outcomes.143 
C. Analysis 
We start by identifying the contextual factors contained in our data, as well 
as our outcome of interest.  Our objective is to identify the various 
combinations of contextual factors that are associated with either card checks 
or elections.  Thus, our outcome of interest is the type of organizing event.  
The contextual factors used for the QCA are the same characteristics (i.e., 
variables) discussed above, namely level of government (city, county, state) 
and type of public employees (white collar, safety, firefighters, blue collar, 
multi-employee).  In addition, we account for the organizing unit size,144 the 
state where the organizing event occurred,145 and whether the organizing event 
occurred after 2003 (the year Illinois passed its mandatory card-check 
legislation). 
Having identified the factors and outcome of interest, we proceed to create 
the truth table.  As it relates to this study, the truth table (Appendix, Table A) 
shows the different kinds of organizing event cases that are represented in the 
data.  Each row in the truth table represents a combination of contextual 
factors.  In addition, we provide information on the number of times each 
combination appeared and what percentage of that total number of cases 
involved either card checks or elections. 
 
 141. Soulliere, supra note 132, at 425. 
 142. Musheno et al., supra note 132, at 753. 
 143. At this point, QCA allows the researcher a number of options, depending on the research 
objectives.  As described in the next subsection, we utilize the results of the truth table to classify 
the various combinations present in our data in terms of whether they tended to be related to card-
check or election activities. 
 144. Because QCA requires the use of dichotomous variables, data on the average number of 
employees in an organizing event are used to create the variable Unit-Size which equals one if the 
organizing unit is larger than the average unit size for Illinois or Ohio and zero otherwise. 
 145. This variable is coded as “1” if the event occurred in Illinois and as “0” otherwise. 
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A casual examination of the truth table illustrates both the complexity and 
contextual richness of our data.  For instance, of the 120 combinations possible 
in our analysis,146 98 different combinations are observed in our data.  Further, 
the truth table reveals that a particular combination of factors is rarely 
associated with only one type of organizing event.  In fact, that occurs only 31 
times in our data and most of these involved very few cases.147  Instead, we 
find that the majority of combinations (i.e., the rows in the truth table) result in 
a mixture of card checks and elections.  This indicates that both types of 
organizing events (card checks and elections) occur under similar conditions 
and thus is suggestive of the complexity of the outcome under analysis. 
To help make sense of this complexity, we use probabilistic methods to 
determine whether a particular combination of factors is usually sufficient for 
card check organizing (or representation elections) to occur.  We do that by 
specifying a benchmark or threshold that must be met to classify combinations.  
The benchmark we apply for this purpose is .65; that is, if the proportion of 
organizing events that were card checks (or elections) for a given combination 
of case characteristics is significantly greater than .65, we can say the 
combination is usually sufficient for a card check (or election) organizing 
event to occur.  For this analysis, we examine only those combinations that 
appear in the data at least seven times.  This frequency threshold is chosen 
because no fewer than seven consistent cases (e.g., all card checks or all 
elections) are needed to pass a probabilistic test of significance at p<.05 when 
using a benchmark of .65. 
Applying this probabilistic benchmark and sorting the data by state and 
time period (before and after the Illinois legislation), we show the 
combinations that are significantly associated with a specific type of 
organizing event, and also explore the extent to which those combinations 
changed between the two relevant time periods.  Table 6 provides the results of 
this analysis and also includes information from the truth table, such as the 
number of organizing events that shared that combination of characteristics 
and columns showing the percentages of organizing events that were card 
checks and elections, respectively. 
 
 146. The total number of combinations depends on the outcome variable (a dichotomous 
variable in our case) and the number of contextual factors.  We have 5 contextual factors: state 
where event occurred (Illinois or Ohio); time period (before or after enactment of card-check 
law); level of government (city, county, state); type of employee involved (white collar, 
firefighters, safety, blue collar, multi-employee unit); and bargaining unit size (big or small).  To 
calculate the total number of possible combinations one would multiply the number of options for 
each of the factors.  In our case that is 2x2x3x5x2, for a total of 120. 
 147. See infra Appendix Truth Table; Table 6.  Twenty-four of those involved combinations 
of six or fewer cases, nineteen were associated with elections only, and five were associated with 
card checks only. 
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Table 6148 
Organizing Events Patterns 
State and 
Time 
Period Level of Gov’t Employee Type
Unit 
Size
Organizing 
Events
Pct. 
Card 
Checks
Pct. 
Elections 
Illinois, 
Pre-2004 
City Safety Small  88  9.1  90.9* 
City Safety Big  15  6.7  93.3* 
 City Blue Collar Small  54  20.4  79.6* 
 City Fire Small  41  19.5  80.5* 
 County Safety Small  42  2.4  97.6* 
 County Safety Big  14  0  100* 
 County White Collar Big  12  8.3  91.7* 
Illinois, 
Post-2003 
City Safety Small  158  72.1*  27.8 
City Blue Collar Small  77  83.1 *  16.9 
 City White Collar Small  65  87.7*  12.3 
 City Multi-Employee Small  7  100*  0 
 County White Collar Small  64  78.1*  21.9 
 County Blue Collar Small  17  94.1*  5.9 
 State White Collar Small  100  92*  8.0 
 State Blue Collar Small  8  100*  0 
Ohio,  
Pre-2004 
City Safety Small  132  21.2  78.8* 
City Blue Collar Small  32  18.7  81.3* 
 County Safety Small  67  14.9  85.1* 
 County Blue Collar Small  23  0  100* 
 County Safety Big  26  11.5  88.5* 
 County White Collar Big  12  8.3  91.7* 
 County Multi-Employee Small  8  0  100* 
Ohio, 
Post-2003 
City Safety Small  86  15.1  84.9* 
City  Safety Big  8  0  100* 
 County Blue Collar Small  9  0  100* 
 State Safety Small  8  0  100* 
* Illustrates whether the combination is significantly associated with card checks 
or elections using the .65 threshold and .05 level of significance as described in the 
text. 
 
 148. Data comes from sources cited supra note 114. 
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The Table 6 results confirm our earlier findings.  First, before 2004, 
Illinois and Ohio experienced very similar organizing activity among their 
public sector employees.  During the 1999 to 2003 time period, card checks 
were never the dominant form of organizing in any context in either state.149  
However, there were several contexts in which elections dominated organizing 
events.  In Ohio, prior to 2004, among the contexts where there were 
organizing events, elections were significantly likely to occur if the organizing 
events involved either small units of city safety employees, small units of city 
or county blue-collar employees, small or big units of county safety 
employees, big units of county white-collar employees, or small multi-
employee groups of county employees.  What is most obvious from this 
analysis is the dominance of elections in organizing events involving various 
types of county employees. 
Similarly, in Illinois prior to 2004, there were several contexts where 
elections were significantly likely to occur, but none where card checks 
dominated organizing activity.150  Elections were significantly likely to occur 
in organizing events involving either small or big units of city safety 
employees, small units of city blue-collar employees, small units of city fire 
employees, small or big units of county safety employees, or big units of 
county white-collar employees.  The prevalence of elections for city and 
county safety employees is the dominant finding here.  It is also interesting to 
note that five of the seven contexts significantly associated with election 
activity in Illinois are the same as Ohio’s before 2004, further reinforcing 
similarities in organizing activity between the states during the 1999 to 2003 
time period. 
Major differences across the two states, however, become apparent when 
considering the post-2003 results.  In Ohio, elections continued to be the only 
dominant form of organizing, although there were fewer contexts dominated 
by elections.151  With one exception, all involved small numbers of organizing 
events.  In Illinois, one can clearly see the effect of the 2003 card-check 
legislation on union organizing.  After 2003, two of the contexts that were 
significantly associated with election activity in Illinois shifted to reliance on 
card checks—small units of city safety employees and small units of city blue-
 
 149. See supra Table 6.  In fact, the results also show that for Ohio, card checks were never 
the dominant form of organizing in any context during either time period. 
 150. See supra Table 6. 
 151. See supra Table 6.  In the pre-2004 period there were seven contexts dominated by 
elections, as compared to only four in the post-2003 period.  Post-2003 elections were 
significantly likely to dominate when the organizing event involved small or big units of city 
safety employees, small units of county blue collar employees, or small units of state safety 
employees.  The fact that there were fewer contexts where elections constituted the dominant 
form of organizing suggests that there were more contexts where card-checks and elections 
occurred at a more balanced rate. 
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collar employees.  Moreover, the increase in card-check organizing in other 
contexts shifted the balance toward card checks as the dominant form of 
organizing activity.  After 2003, card-check organizing in Illinois was 
significantly likely to occur for organizing events involving either small units 
of white-collar workers at all levels of government (city, county, and state); 
small units of blue-collar workers at all levels of government (city, county, and 
state); small units of city safety workers; or small units of city multi-employee 
groups of employees. 
In short, the Table 6 results indicate that following the enactment of the 
Illinois’ statute, card checks became the dominant form of organizing in some 
of the same contexts where elections had been the dominant form.  The results 
also show that card checks became the dominant organizing method in several 
new contexts (i.e., environments where up to that point, card checks might 
have occurred, but not as the dominant form of organizing activity).  These 
results suggest that the Illinois legislation not only led unions to shift their 
organizing methods toward card checks, but also to expand their organizing 
efforts to other contexts.  In particular, the most dramatic changes in 
organizing activity resulting from the passage of card-check legislation appear 
to have involved small units of blue-collar or white-collar workers at all levels 
of government.152 
VII.  IMPLICATIONS 
The findings from our research confirm expectations regarding the 
potential impact of card-check legislation on union organizing as it relates to 
changes in the organizing process.  In our current labor law regime, nonunion 
representation is the default rule.153  In the absence of card-check authorization 
legislation, the parties most directly involved in the union organizing process, 
unions and employers, often have the option of relying on an election to 
determine union representation or agreeing to use signatures on union 
authorization cards.154  Under these conditions, the use of card checks depends 
on voluntary agreement between the union seeking representation rights and 
the employer whose employees are the target of the organizing campaign.155  
Given the historical opposition of employers to union representation,156 
 
 152. See supra Table 6. 
 153. Sachs, supra note 9, at 672. 
 154. Id. at 664–65. 
 155. See id. at 665 & n.29. 
 156. See William T. Dickens, The Effect of Company Campaigns on Certification Elections: 
Law and Reality Once Again, 36 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 560, 563–67 (1983) (analyzing the 
effect of employer tactics in organizing election outcomes); John J. Lawler, The Influence of 
Management Consultants on the Outcome of Union Certification Elections, 38 INDUS. & LAB. 
REL. REV. 38, 38–39 (1984) (describing the effects of the use of management consultants on 
union organizing elections); Kate Bronfenbrenner, The Role of Union Strategies in NLRB 
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employers are unlikely to acquiesce to a request for voluntary recognition.157  
In fact, these same concerns were expressed in the Illinois legislature by 
supporters of the card-check statute.  Supporters of the card-check bill 
described the existing law as requiring workers to go “through a difficult 
process to form a union.”158  The election process was described as “lengthy 
and cumbersome,” giving the employer “time to scare workers into voting 
against a union” even if the workers wanted one.159 
Implied in the concerns voiced by supporters of the Illinois card-check 
statute was the expectation that unions, if given the opportunity, will prefer to 
organize via card checks and that the new legislation would result in an 
increase in organizing activity, specifically card-check organizing.  In fact, this 
is the effect one would expect to occur from the adoption of an asymmetry-
correcting altering rule, such as card-check legislation, under Professor Sachs’ 
model.160  When card-check authorization legislation is present, voluntary 
compliance by the employer is no longer needed—with some restrictions the 
choice belongs to the union.161  Predictably, mandated card-check recognition 
benefits union organizing efforts.162 
Our analyses show that in both Illinois and Ohio, public sector union 
density was stable or slightly increasing from 1983 to 2008.  Yet, our data also 
indicate that in recent years, organizing activity in Illinois has been higher than 
in Ohio.  In addition, our data demonstrate that public employees were 
organized through a mix of elections and card-check authorizations; union 
success rates in organizing events were quite high; and organizing events 
 
Certification Elections, 50 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 195, 201–05 (1997) (listing several tactics 
commonly used by employers in the course of organizing campaigns). 
 157. See Adrienne E. Eaton & Jill Kriesky, Dancing with the Smoke Monster: Employer 
Motivations for Negotiating Neutrality and Card Check Agreements, in JUSTICE ON THE JOB: 
PERSPECTIVES ON THE EROSION OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE UNITED STATES 139, 156–
58 (Richard N. Block et al. eds., 2006).  Employers, however, might be willing to agree to card 
checks in order to avoid the costs associated with mounting a vigorous anti-union campaign.  
These costs could include: hiring the consultant; running the campaign; lost work time; and legal 
expenses.  For those employers that have an existing bargaining relationship, an additional cost is 
the potential harm to the labor-management relationship associated with an anti-union campaign.  
The decision by employers to agree to a card check procedure can be motivated as well by the 
desire to avoid the negative business consequences associated with a union led corporate 
campaign.  See Eaton & Kriesky, supra note 9, at 48–51; see also Eaton & Kriesky, supra note 
157, at 147–50 (discussing various costs to employers regarding card-check agreements). 
 158. Third Reading of H.B. 3396 Before the S., 93rd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2003) 
(statement of Sen. Sandoval), available at http://www.ilga.gov/senate/transcripts/strans93/ 
09300050.pdf. 
 159. Id. 
 160. See supra Part III.B. 
 161. See Sachs, supra note 9, at 668. 
 162. See id. at 668–71. 
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occurred at all levels of government and tended to involve traditionally 
organized groups of public employees. 
Consistent with the implications of the structural model, our results 
indicate that adoption of card-check legislation in Illinois altered the 
organizing landscape for public sector unions and employers.163  New 
organizing opportunities for unions led to increases in organizing activity, 
more newly organized employees, and a shift in the types of employers and 
employees that were the target of organizing campaigns.  A comparison of the 
types of organizing events between the two states clearly indicates that most of 
the organizing in Illinois after 2003 was through card checks.  In Ohio, on the 
other hand, card-check organizing remained fairly stable across the two periods 
under study. 
We are confident these findings can be generalized to other public sector 
environments.  Thus, one would expect that the various other states that have 
enacted card-check laws (e.g., Massachusetts,164 New Hampshire,165 New 
Jersey,166 and Oregon167) likely experienced growth in organizing activity 
among public employees and that most of that organizing activity was through 
card checks. 
We also believe that our results are instructive with regard to the debate 
surrounding enactment of the EFCA.  To be sure, the dynamics of the two 
sectors are different enough to warn against wholesale adoption of the lessons 
that either sector might have for the other.168  Thus, we share these 
observations with that caveat in mind. 
For our purposes, perhaps the major difference between the public and 
private sector organizing environments is the relatively more favorable 
organizing environment for public sector unions.169  For over three decades, 
unionization rates in the public sector have been about three times those of the 
private sector.170  Because public employers’ budgets are not dependent on 
 
 163. See supra Table 6. 
 164. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 150E, § 4 (2008). 
 165. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 273-A:10, IX (Supp. 2007). 
 166. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-5.3 (West 2008). 
 167. OR. REV. STAT. § 243.682(2)(a) (2007). 
 168. See Clyde W. Summers, Public Employee Bargaining: A Political Perspective, 83 YALE 
L.J. 1156, 1159–61 (1974) (identifying the main differences between public and private 
employment); Clyde W. Summers, Public Sector Bargaining: Problems of Governmental 
Decisionmaking, 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 669, 669–72 (1975); Clyde Summers, Bargaining in the 
Government’s Business: Principles and Politics, 18 U. TOL. L. REV. 265, 281 (1987); Clyde 
Summers, Public Sector Bargaining, A Different Animal, 5 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 441, 441–42 
(2003). 
 169. Kate Bronfenbrenner & Tom Juravich, The Impact of Employer Opposition on Union 
Certification Win Rates: A Private/Public Sector Comparison 26 (Econ. Policy Inst., Working 
Paper No. 113, 1994), available at http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles/19/. 
 170. See Bennett & Masters, supra note 24, at 535–37. 
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profits (as is the case for employers in the private sector), public employers are 
less likely to see unions as a threat to their economic survival.171  In fact, to the 
extent public employers are interested in maximizing their chances of staying 
in office and unions represent an important component of the electorate, public 
employers might even be hesitant to aggressively oppose unions which are 
actively organizing public employees.172 
Given the reduced incentives for employer opposition to unions in the 
public sector, one would expect public sector unions to be less concerned about 
facing an election and, therefore, less eager to shift towards card-check 
organizing.  Similarly, given that union density rates are higher in the public 
sector,173 one would also expect there to be less pent up demand for union 
representation available for release after passage of a mandatory card-check 
law.  And yet, our results show that even in this relatively favorable 
environment, when faced with the opportunity to engage in card-check 
organizing, public sector unions in Illinois took advantage of that opportunity. 
If card-check legislation leads to more union organizing and subsequent 
membership growth in the public sector, there should be similar, perhaps even 
greater advantages to unions in the private sector, where unions often confront 
vehement opposition by profit-minded managements.174  Private sector unions 
will have a stronger incentive to pursue card-check organizing in order to 
avoid some of the aggressive employer opposition they often encounter in 
election campaigns.175  And because union density rates in the private sector 
have been much lower than in the public sector, there may be more ripe 
organizing targets for unions to pursue.  In short, mandatory card-check 
legislation for private sector employees would appear to provide an 
opportunity for significant increases in union organizing activity and union 
growth. 
However, union optimism about life with the EFCA should be tempered.  
After all, private sector employers appear prepared to respond aggressively to 
card-check organizing efforts.176  Mandating that employers recognize a union 
on the basis of card checks will not lessen the incentives employers have for 
opposing unions.  Consequently, a change in the law may simply shift the 
timing at which employers will initiate their anti-union campaigns.177 
 
 171. See Richard B. Freeman, Unionism Comes to the Public Sector, 24 J. ECON. 
LITERATURE 41, 61–62 (1986). 
 172. See James A. Craft, Future Directions in Public Sector Labor Relations: A 2020 
Perspective, 24 J. LAB. RES. 545, 548 (2003). 
 173. Bronfenbrenner & Juravich, supra note 169, at 14. 
 174. Id. at 7. 
 175. See id. 
 176. See id. at 6. 
 177. See TERRY L. LEAP, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING & LABOR RELATIONS 148–50 (1st ed. 
1991). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2011] ORGANIZING PRINCIPLES 515 
Private employers, who lack incentives to agree to card-check 
authorization under existing labor law, could adopt preemptive tactics designed 
to reduce the likelihood of a union organizing campaign.178  For example, 
employers might adopt positive/proactive measures intended to eliminate 
employees’ perceived need for union representation, such as establishing an 
adequate and equitable compensation system, developing positive supervisory-
employee relations, establishing open channels of communication, or adopting 
some form of alternative dispute resolution system to deal with concerns.179  
Employers could also adopt negative/proactive tactics, such as aggressively 
screening out pro-union job candidates during the hiring process by 
questioning job applicants about their union sentiments.180  While directly 
asking such questions is illegal,181 various observers have noted that companies 
sometimes use indirect methods to achieve the same objective.182  For 
example, employers in an industry with traditionally high unionization rates 
might seek to hire employees with no prior work experience in the industry on 
the assumption those employees are less likely to have belonged to a union.183 
Of course, as frequently occurs in conjunction with many organizing 
campaigns, employers might continue to rely on reactive strategies to 
counteract any unionization efforts.184  It has been amply documented that 
employers facing unionization campaigns are very likely to hire consultants to 
run vigorous anti-union campaigns.185  Anti-union campaigns have become 
rather sophisticated affairs, including a variety of both legal (e.g., letter 
writing, captive audience speeches) and illegal tactics and activities (e.g., 
dismissals).186 
Thus, the proposed amendments to the NLRA, which are intended to 
facilitate card-check recognition, raise the possibility of increased union 
avoidance behavior by employers at pre- or very early-organizing stages of an 
 
 178. Id. 
 179. See id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. See, e.g., Center Construction Company, Inc., Cases 7-CA-46490, 2004 WL 2138582 
(NLRB Sept. 21, 2004) (finding questions concerning union sympathies in the context of job 
application interviews to be inherently coercive); Rochester Cadet Cleaners, Inc., 205 N.L.R.B. 
773 (1973) (finding that the employer violated the Act by asking a job applicant whether her 
former employers were unionized and whether she had belonged to a union). 
 182. See Gregory M. Saltzman, Job Applicant Screening by a Japanese Transplant: A Union-
Avoidance Tactic, 49 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 88, 91 (1995) (discussing some of the tactics 
used by Japanese automobile plants operating in the United States to screen out union 
sympathizers). 
 183. Id. 
 184. LEAP, supra note 177, 148–50. 
 185. See John J. Lawler & Robin West, Impact of Union-Avoidance Strategy in 
Representation Elections, 24 IND. REL. 406, 408–09 (1985). 
 186. See Bronfenbrenner & Juravich, supra note 169, at 7. 
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organizing campaign.  Whether such a reaction by employers will be effective 
in countering the likely increase in union organizing activity associated with 
mandatory card-check legislation depends on what actions unions take in 
response. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
Research on union organizing increasingly focuses on the use of card-
check authorization as a means of achieving union representation.  While much 
of the published work has been commentaries on the pros and cons of 
mandated card-check recognition, our paper examines the impact of such 
legislation on union organizing activity and outcomes using data on public 
sector organizing at the state and local levels in Illinois and Ohio. 
We find that, not surprisingly, the Illinois card-check statute has allowed 
public sector unions to reduce their reliance on elections as the primary form of 
organizing activity.  We also find that the card-check legislation appears to 
allow or encourage public sector unions in Illinois to organize in environments 
where they had not organized as extensively before. 
Our findings should be of interest to researchers exploring the effects of 
public sector labor laws on organizing activity among public employees.  
Given that various states have recently adopted legislation similar to the 
Illinois statute,187 tracking the impact of these laws should be of interest to 
those wanting to understand labor relations outcomes.  Our findings may also 
be relevant to the debate surrounding the EFCA.  While significant differences 
exist between the public and private employment sectors, our results provide 
some evidence of the potential effects the EFCA could have on private sector 
union organizing activity. 
 
  
 
 187. See supra notes 38–49 and accompanying text. 
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